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Life of the Party: Social
Networks, Public Attention,
and the Importance of Shocks
in the Presidential Nomination
Process
Elizabeth A. Stiles , Colin D. Swearingen, and Linda M. Seiter 

Abstract
We examine the effects of shocks on the invisible Presidential primary in the United States. First,
we build on existing models using an algorithm simulating social network shocks. Findings show
that positive shocks signiﬁcantly aid the lead candidate’s chances of winning in the invisible
primary. Negative shocks, however, are less detrimental to a lead candidate than positive shocks
are helpful, as the leader is often able to survive a negative shock and still emerge victorious. Broad
empirical tests demonstrate the importance of shocks as well. Beyond the importance of shocks,
ﬁndings also suggest that Presidential candidate success in the invisible primary owes more to
public- than elite-driven factors.
Keywords
political science, social organization, sociology, social networks, invisible primary, presidency,
presidential primary

In 1968, the country watched in shock as national media outlets showed the violence that erupted in
Chicago during the Democratic National Convention. With incumbent Lyndon Johnson’s stunning
decision not to seek re-election and frontrunner Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination earlier that
summer, Hubert Humphrey won the Party nomination without competing in any primaries.
Consequently, the Party adopted new reforms in 1972 that incentivized state parties to adopt the
primary.
These reforms resulted in a democratizing shift towards public selection of the Party nominee
in the 1970’s at the expense of party elites, who had more directly controlled state conventions.
Yet, elites hesitated to fully democratize presidential nominations, incorporating a series of checks
on the masses, such as increasing the number of superdelegates involved in the process. This pushand-pull between democratization and elite control over the nomination process affects how

campaigns approach the invisible primary, or “the organizational building, strategic maneuvering,
and resource acquisition that candidates do in the six months to a year before the Iowa caucuses”
(Aldrich, 2009, p. 33).

Introduction
While the theory of presidential nominations focuses on momentum (i.e. winning in Iowa provides
momentum for New Hampshire which provides further momentum, etc.), the starting point (t0)
from which the momentum in Iowa builds is also extremely important, perhaps best embodied by
the “party decides” thesis, which states that elites still exert signiﬁcant control over the nomination
process through endorsements (Cohen et al., 2008). In 2000, through an early strong start in the
invisible primary, George W. Bush began the Iowa race about 15–20% ahead of Elizabeth Dole
going into the Iowa contest. In a contest between these two plausible candidates, the early strong
start during the invisible primary, including earning a rush of early endorsements (538.com), gave
Bush a critical lead which helped him to secure the nomination (Aldrich, 2009).
Although elites and circumstances countered the democratizing early effects of the shift to primaries,
currently the internet and social media are straining elite control and may be returning some of the power
back to the public. With communication systems where the marginal message is free and algorithms can
deliver that message to the recipients it predicts are most likely to be receptive, today is an especially
important time to study the public effects on the shaping of the invisible primary. After all, Donald
Trump never had much overt elite political support in 2016 but he was able to secure the Republican
nomination easily with his dedicated base of followers. Certainly, candidates are still working in the
invisible primary to position themselves as frontrunner for the state contests and these elite maneuvers
remain important. But today, public attention is also important to consider when explaining support for
political candidates in the invisible primary (Stiles et al., 2020; Swearingen et al., 2019).
While evidence for the importance and validity of public attention has been established in
various political contexts (Ripberger, 2011; Stiles & Grogan-Myers, 2018; Swearingen &
Ripberger, 2014; Swearingen et al., 2019), the theoretical rationale requires further explication. We build on our previous theoretical model (Stiles et al., 2020) to more fully explain social
networks as drivers of public attention. We modify that model by adding media and shocks and run
simulations to examine the effect of messages about candidate preferences operating through
social networks on candidate support during the invisible primary. Finally, we provide a broad
empirical test which demonstrates the importance of public attention, media attention, and shocks
to candidate support during the invisible primary.

Theoretical Framework
In this section, we review key theoretical insights about invisible primaries, emphasizing features
which make social network analysis an especially useful approach. Next, we review social
network analysis, contextualizing variables from the political primaries’ literature using insights
from this ﬁeld. Then, we consider the media and social media as connections between local party
structures and personal networks. Finally, we discuss how political shocks can affect the invisible
primary, focusing on three of the most frequent shocks—scandals, fundraising reports, and
debates— and their impacts on political outcomes.

Invisible Primary
How do candidates compete in something that is invisible? Presidential primary voters do not rely
on the typical factors used by voters in the general election, such as party identiﬁcation, economic

performance, and incumbency (Steger et al., 2012). Further, there is a high level of volatility in
voters’ preferences during this period, in part because the public shifts its attention from one
candidate to another (Steger, 2007). In this difﬁcult environment, candidates must work their
networks of elites, gaining support from members of Congress, governors, and other political
notables. Elites then signal their support to voters which impacts outcomes (Cohen, 2008).
Although some primary contests may deviate from the pattern, a number of scholars ﬁnd that elite
endorsements are predictors of primary outcomes (Dowdle et al., 2016; Steger, 2007; Summary,
2010).
However, when elites do not agree on the candidate, outsiders play a larger role (Steger, 2015).
Further, elite division is not uncommon. In one-third of all primary contests since 1980, elites
waited to endorse a candidate until after the invisible primary had concluded (Whitby, 2014). In
races without a clear frontrunner, then the explanation for outcomes of the nomination contest
turns to momentum from winning Iowa and New Hampshire (Steger, 2013). The momentum
explanation has strong empirical support in the literature but is not helpful for explaining the
invisible primaries that precede them.
Other variables in the primary literature, however, should be considered for the invisible
primary. Media attention can prolong candidates’ campaigns (Shen, 2008) and when candidates’
media attention increases, their vote shares increase as well. Other scholars examine the effects of
money on securing the nomination but do not ﬁnd much empirical support (Adkins & Dowdle,
2005; Mayer, 2003). Dowdle et al. (2016) ﬁnd support for cash on hand as predictive of the
aggregate primary vote but only in models estimated after the New Hampshire primary.
Finally, public attention has been found to predict success in the presidential primary
(Swearingen et al., 2019). Public attention is conceptualized as relative attention that people are
paying to one issue as opposed to any other issue (Swearingen & Ripberger, 2014). Appropriate to
the dynamics of the attention economy, this ﬁnding holds up well in models estimated on data
previous to the Iowa and New Hampshire, the time period of the invisible primary.

Social Networks
The people you surround yourself with shape how you view the world. Messages and other
information travel from person to person within the network arrays of which we are part. Various
characteristics of our social networks (e.g., size of network, density of connections, number of ties
per node) all shape communication, affecting a variety of attitudes and behaviors, including
entrepreneurial activities (Aldrich and Kim, 2007), fertility decisions (Kohler et al., 2001),
political participation (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998), voting in one’s self-interest (Sokhey & McClurg,
2012), and volunteering (Wang & Handy, 2014). Social networks are also important in understanding changes in public attention which in turn is predictive of vote share in the invisible
primary (Swearingen et al., 2019).
We examine the effects of social networks on candidate preference adoption in presidential
primary campaigns. Campaign messaging, like much information in social networks (Monsted
et al., 2017), spreads by complex dynamics, dependent on at least two neighbors signaling
candidate support. Beyond this ﬂoor, however, people have varying degrees of resistance to
political messaging. Some voters are even true believers, supporters who will never change their
preference no matter how many of their friends disagree. Mostly, however, people have variable
but on average low amounts of information about politics. Consequently, they are unable to resist
messages if they receive them consistently enough and will adopt the candidate that the messages
direct them to (Zaller, 1992).
Given people’s susceptibility to repeated messaging and their embeddedness in networks, we
adopt a threshold model of candidate preference adoption (Granovetter, 1978; Granovetter &

Soong, 1983) for multiple reasons. The threshold model examines conditions under which
cascades of collective action may occur given heterogeneous preferences for action in the
population contingent upon how many others act. We update this model in two important ways.
First, reﬂective of political primaries in which voters may have more than one choice, we adjust
the model so that nodes may adopt one of a number of candidates or remain undecided. (Como
et al. (2016) formally adapt the threshold model for multi-party systems). Second, we adapt the
model within a social network framework so that preferences are only communicated to nodes
(which represent individuals) through edges (or ties) in the network. This adaptation is standard in
social network analysis but should be noted as a departure from Granovetter (1978) who used the
example of a group of people milling about a public place where the actions of any would affect
the preferences of all.
Since preferences have been constrained to travel through networks, network structure is
consequential, affecting outcomes through several dynamics, including density, size, and average
degrees. We employ a Barabasi model of network formation and evolution wherein nodes show
preferential attachment to nodes which already have more connections (BarabaÃsi et al., 2002;
Barabási & Albert, 1999). This tendency has been empirically observed in a range of networks
(e.g., a scientiﬁc publishing network (BarabaÃsi et al., 2002) and on Twitter (Cha et al., 2012)).
In a political primary, several factors affect network dynamics in a way that is distinct from a
general election. First, primaries have low salience and so the size of the network of inﬂuence is
smaller (Rolfe, 2013). In a lower salience election, information is also likely to be more limited,
which results in less ability to resist messages (Zaller, 1992). Second, social networks tend toward
homophily or sameness (Santoro & Beck, 2018). However, this network characteristic may be less
true in a primary network. It is reasonable to expect that voters who disagree may be less likely to
exit a social network during a primary. Instead, they may remain in the social network in anticipation of the general election. With a network built primarily for the contest to follow, with exit
less likely, and with low information, messages traveling through social networks during primaries
can be highly persuasive.

Media
The media has gone through drastic changes in the last generation. Traditional media (such as
newspapers, legacy print and broadcast sources) in interaction with social media can cause
signiﬁcant swings in mass behavior. For example, King et al. (2017) conducted an experiment
wherein 48 media outlets published stories approved by the authors and on dates randomly
assigned by the authors. They found that publication of these stories led to a 62.7% increase in
broad policy discussion around that topic on social media in the treatment week, assuring us that a
changed media environment nevertheless exerts signiﬁcant agenda-setting power.
The type of message and elite context may inﬂuence engagement, however. On social media,
fake news travels faster and farther than on legacy print and broadcast news publishers’ media
sites (Martens et al., 2018). While countervailing media and uniﬁed social elites can mitigate the
effect of media bias, media with anti-status quo messages have an advantage over more traditional
media (Siegel, 2013). This tendency is exacerbated when foreign governments use social media to
depict the United States in divisive ways. For example, the Russian Internet Research Agency
(IRA) produces newsfeeds signiﬁcantly more likely to stress crime and identity danger in their
English-language newsfeeds (Ehrett et al., 2021).
Since most media consumers get at least some of their news from social media, we must
consider the dynamics of mass media outlets in a social media context. First, communication is
mostly one-way as mass media outlets (e.g. BBC) do not typically follow users that follow them.
Unlike most social media users, their purpose of joining the network is not to build their

relationships but to act as broadcasters. While broadcasters are critical for disseminating news
stories, evangelists (aka inﬂuence makers or opinion leaders) also play an important role in
bringing the news to parts of the network structure who do not receive initial broadcasts (Cha
et al., 2012). There is also a celebrity effect on social media beyond their large numbers of
connections, as messages from celebrities are more likely to be re-posted than non-celebrities
(Zhang et al., 2017).
Mass user characteristics may also inﬂuence transmission of social media messages. For
example, a disproportionate number of users who share stories on Twitter are white and male,
biasing the story selection to the interests of those groups (Reis et al., 2017). However, King et al.
(2017) found that user posts on their news stories were relatively evenly distributed across party,
gender, and region. There is also evidence that network members who send messages to members
of the network are more likely than observers or those who do not use social media to change their
opinion to agree with the majority sentiment (Maruyama et al., 2014).

Shocks
Previous work showed how voters remain undecided if the frontrunner does not have enough
initial and unswayable support to convert the network. Initial support, or seeds, is voters that
support a candidate at the beginning of the race and provide a favorable network context. Another
critical kind of support is true believers, who never switch support from a candidate regardless of
network activity or neighbor support. Even with strong initial support, support must be reinforced
through the network or preference decay will result (Stiles et al., 2020). In this environment, a
shock could tip the balance and allow costly delays for the frontrunner or even result in an upset.
Shocks are “unavoidable, high salience changes or events” (Fieldhouse et al., p. 31) that create
uncertainty and cannot easily be managed or explained away. They can also cause voters to reevaluate their voting behavior in ways that regular politics do not. A severe enough shock can
cause volatility in party systems and even lead to dealignment (Fieldhouse et al., 2019). Shocks
could raise (or lower) resistance to a candidate, requiring more (or less) candidate support from
neighbors. Many shocks have a temporary effect, so over a few iterations, nodes will adopt close to
their initial resistance levels to candidates (hence the particular utility of an October surprise in the
general election). Other shocks doom the candidate (e.g. Gary Hart) or partially rewire networks
(e.g. Donald Trump’s ascendancy in the Republican party drew some ardent supporters and caused
other long-time Republicans to exit).
While shocks could take on practically inﬁnite forms and effects, there are nevertheless some
potential shocks that take place fairly often and have effects that are consistent with the stage of the
primary process. In the beginning stages of the invisible primary, a positive shock can raise a
candidate’s stature as winnability is important to voters. A negative shock could take a candidate
out as this is the winnowing phase of the primary. As the primary becomes visible, the ﬁrst few
contests can be shocks as winnowing persists. In this paper, we are guided in our conceptualizing
of shocks by considering three of the more common types, a scandal, a positive fundraising quarter
report and debates.
A scandal consists of evidence or perception of misbehavior that is covered in the media and
upon which other candidates often try to capitalize (Nyhan, 2009) through negative campaigning
(Nyhan, 2015; Spurlock, 2013). Scandals dominate media coverage of a campaign (Nyhan, 2015;
Puglisi & Snyder, 2008; Spurlock, 2013) and are often accompanied by a spike in public attention
(Ellis et al., 2017). They can be particularly harmful to candidates when there is a slow news cycle
(Nyhan, 2015).
A positive fundraising report is a positive shock for the candidate. While most studies of the
effects of fundraising on campaigns ﬁnd that money only matters on the margins (Gerber &

Morton, 1998; Jacobson, 1985), there has been insufﬁcient focus on the importance of fundraising
early. Since party and incumbency effects are not usually relevant to primaries, fundraising may be
the most reliable predictor of outcomes (Bonica, 2017). A positive report signals strength and
winnability to other candidates, media, and donors, potentially causing more contributions, media
coverage, and sometimes even a winnowing of the competition. These changes could in turn lower
voters’ thresholds for that candidate, making him or her more likely to win their vote.
Debates can also produce a shock for candidates’ campaigns, either negative or positive
depending on candidate performance and voter evaluation. Since candidates are competing with
each other on the same stage, the shock can be positive for one candidate and negative for another
(e.g., after a heated political exchange such as between Joe Biden and Kamala Harris in 2020).
While debates do not make much of a difference in the general election (Holbrook, 1996), primary
debates matter more in terms of voters’ evaluations and preferred candidate. McKinney and
Warner (2013) found that 60% of debate viewers changed their candidate evaluations and nearly a
third changed their voting choice as a result of primary debates.

Methodology
In the methods section, we extend a previous model of primary candidate support to incorporate
shocks. Next, we use the revised model to simulate primary contests, compare our simulated
results to the previous model, and more generally to examine the robustness of our expectations.
Finally, we provide a broad empirical test of the model using data from recent primary seasons.
Details on each method are provided within each section.

Simulations of Invisible Primary Messaging Through Social Networks
A Barabasi–Albert (BA) graph structure is used to model the social network among voters. A BA
graph is scale free (meaning the underlying structure of the network does not change if the size of
the network changes) and exhibits preferential attachment (new nodes that enter a network prefer
to attach to nodes that already have large numbers of connections). We use this type of graph
structure to model supernodes (nodes with many connections) and because this kind of structure is
empirically common (Barabási & Albert, 1999). Each node represents a voter and an undirected
edge between nodes represents a bidirectional inﬂuencing relationship between voters. Two nodes
connected by an edge are referred to as neighbors. The graph of 1000 nodes is grown by creating
nodes with 10 edges each that are preferentially attached to existing nodes with high degree (all
data, simulated and empirical, can be accessed at https://github.com/lseiter/lifeoftheparty).
The simulation involves a set of three candidates. Each voter has a threshold for each candidate,
which is the minimum number of neighbors who must prefer a candidate in order for the voter to
switch their preference to that candidate. The simulation depicts a series of time intervals in which
voter preferences are updated based on voter thresholds and current neighbor preferences. If
multiple candidate thresholds are met for a particular voter, preference is given to the candidate
meeting the lowest threshold, or a random choice in the event of a tie. The simulation continues to
update voter preferences based on candidate thresholds until preferences stabilize.
As previously mentioned, seeds, true believers, and decay affect the voter preference model
(Stiles et al., 2020) and we include these parameters in our model. A voter with an initial
preference for a candidate is referred to as a seed. The seed proportion for Candidate 1 varies from
0.18 to 0.22, while candidates 2 and 3 each had an equal seed proportion of 0.15. Figure 1 shows
that a sizable lead as given by initial seed proportions within the social network is critical for a
candidate to overcome not just other candidates, but to sway the undecided voter. A true believer’s
threshold is set such that their candidate preference will never change, while an adherent’s

threshold allows a change in candidate preference. Figure 1 also shows that as the proportion of
true believers decreases from 1.0 to 0.6 for a candidate, their chance of being overcome by an
undecided voter increases.
In this section, we extend the original voter threshold model to incorporate shock by adjusting
voter thresholds for a given candidate for some period of time. Our initial implementation of shock
adjusts the threshold for Candidate 1 for a speciﬁed number of time intervals. The shock amount is
given as a proportion of neighbors for which to adjust voter thresholds. Positive shock decreases
the threshold for Candidate 1, making it easier to become the preferred choice, while negative
shock increases the threshold. The middle row of Figure 2 shows the base case scenario of no
shock, that is, the results from Figure 1. The top row shows the impact of negative shock, causing
voter preference to shift away from Candidate 1, while the bottom row shows the lead for
Candidate 1 increasing due to positive shock. Note that positive shock has a greater impact than an
equal amount of negative shock. In the majority of cases negative shock primarily results in an
increase of undecided voters, although candidates 2 or 3 may gain some ground. This effect is best
exempliﬁed by the right column: with no shock, Candidate 1 wins 70% of the time (at 0.18 seed
proportion) or 100% of the time (at 0.20 seed proportion or higher).
Yet, a shock in either direction changes the dynamic. A positive shock for Candidate 1 increases their winning percentage to 90% at 0.18 seed proportion, while a negative shock decreases
their winning percentage to 50%. The beneﬁciaries of the negative shock are Candidate 3 (from
winning zero percent of the time to winning 10% of the time) and undecided (from 20% to 30%).
In the event that multiple thresholds are met, the algorithm implements a bandwagon effect,
shifting the preference toward Candidate 1 if the threshold for positive shock, and away from
candidate 1 in the case of negative shock.
The results in Figure 2 demonstrate the possible effects of a scandal (negative shock) or a strong
fundraising report (positive shock). In these situations, the thresholds are adjusted for only one
candidate as these events directly envelop that one campaign. The other candidates are indirectly
affected by these shocks inasmuch as they can take advantage of Candidate 1’s miscue or mitigate
Candidate 1’s success.

Figure 1. Voter threshold model.

Figure 2. Effect of shock on voter preference.

Of course, not all shocks occur independently from one another. In a debate, one candidate may
experience success while another struggles. We consider such a situation in Figure 3, where
Candidate 1 received a negative shock and Candidate 2 was given a correspondingly positive
shock, meaning the thresholds for Candidate 1 were increased and those for Candidate 2 decreased. This variation results in a shift of voter preference to Candidate 2 in the case of negative
shock, while little impact is observed with positive shock. Shock length was also varied, with
longer intervals resulting as expected, shifting preference away from Candidate 1 with negative
shock and toward Candidate 1 with positive shock. This happens in all three columns, but again,
note the far right column: A positive shock for Candidate 1 increases their winning percentage (at
0.18 seed proportion) from 50% to 86%. Also note that under a negative shock, Candidate 1 does
not see much change in their winning percentage (50% to 52%), but Candidate 2’s winning
percentage increases from two percent to 12%.

Broad Empirical Test
We next move to a broad empirical test of our hypothesis that shocks affect the state of a
presidential pre-primary period. Before getting into the methodological details, we ﬁrst lay out an
important caveat. We do not yet have network-speciﬁc data complete with nodes and shocks.
Instead, we take a general approach that focuses on aggregate-level candidate support (see
Swearingen et al., 2019). We still expect to see shocks, but instead of being within an individual’s
network and being realized by a network’s level of support for a candidate, the shocks are seen in a
candidate’s overall standing in the race. For example, a candidate who has raised signiﬁcant
money at the fundraising deadline might reduce thresholds and result in greater support for that
candidate within a network while also resulting in higher support for the same candidate overall.
To test this, we examine major-party candidate pre-primary polling support by week from 2008
to 2020 as measured by realclearpolitics.com. Using a pooled cross-sectional time series model
(with the PLM package in R 4.0.0), we regress polling support with a variety of explanatory
variables that are associated with broad support: media attention1, fundraising2, endorsements3,
and public attention4. Since there is a temporal dynamic involved with shocks—they may not be
felt immediately—we include one-week lags for each of these four variables.

Figure 3. Inverse directional shock on candidate 2.

Table 1 provides partial coefﬁcients for the variables of three models. Model 1 includes only the
four key variables detailed above; Model 2 adds a one-week lag for each; Model 3 incorporates an
interaction between donations and the FEC ﬁling deadline. The F-statistic indicates an overall
level of statistical signiﬁcance for each (p < .001). Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity in all
three models, robust standard errors are included. Because of the lagged variables, the n decreases
from 2813 in Model 1 to 2731 in Models 2 and 3.
The results of Model 1 suggest that three of the four broad measures of shocks are statistically
signiﬁcant factors of a candidate’s weekly polling numbers. Media attention, public attention, and

Table 1. Factors affecting candidate polling support, by week, 2008–2020.
Model 1
Elite-Driven measures
Share of endorsements
Share of endorsements (lagged)
Share of media attention
Share of media attention (lagged)
Public-Driven measures
Share of public attention
Share of public attention (lagged)
Donations ($100,000)
Donations (lagged)
Other
Polling (lagged)
Adj. R2
F
Breusch–Pagan test
N

Model 2

Model 3

0.05 (0.03)
—
0.11*** (0.01)
—

0.04 (0.06)
0.14* (0.06)
0.05 (0.04)
0.09 (0.05)

0.04 (0.03)
0.09*** (0.02)
0.01 (0.02)
0.01 (0.01)

0.08*** (0.01)
—
0.03*** (0.01)
—

0.05*** (0.01)
0.07*** (0.02)
0.02** (0.01)
0.03*** (0.01)

0.02* (0.01)
0.03** (0.01)
0.002 (0.004)
0.01* (0.003)

—
0.10
95.55***
573.2***
2813

—
0.16
77.93***
512.4***
2731

Dependent variable is a candidate’s weekly polling support. Robust standard errors used.
***p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

0.77*** (0.01)
0.68
654.21***
36.63**
2730

donations are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, while endorsements are not signiﬁcant (although p < .1). Despite three of the four variables reaching statistical signiﬁcance, they do not
share equal substantive signiﬁcance. For media attention, the average candidate received just over
three television media mentions in a week (Table 2). Multiplying this by the partial coefﬁcient
(0.11) suggests that the typical candidate is expected to gain roughly one-third of a percent in a
given week. But what about a candidate that gets considerably more attention than the typical
candidate? A candidate in the top ﬁve percent of media mentions is expected to add 1.57% to their
poll standing. The substantive effect of public attention is even greater: a candidate at two standard
deviations above the mean is expected to add 2.59% to their weekly polling share. Candidates
raising two standard deviations more than the average candidate are expected to add one-quarter of
a percent to their polling.
Models 2 and 3 add more nuance to the original model. Model 2 adds lagged indicators (1 week)
for the explanatory variables. Substantively speaking, the expected effects of the lagged variables are
similar to the unlagged variables in Model 1, except that media attention is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant. That is, candidates with exceptional public attention are expected to receive nearly an
additional two percent. Candidates with a signiﬁcant bump in fundraising are expected to receive an
additional one-quarter of a percent in polling support. Finally, unlike in Model 1, the lagged number
of endorsement points is signiﬁcant: the typical candidate is expected to receive a 0.14% boost, but
those that receive a spike in endorsement points are expected to add 0.65% in polling support.
Model 3 includes a lagged polling indicator, since it makes sense to expect a candidate’s share of
the polling in a given week to be at least partially explained by their previous week’s polling. Indeed,
we see that this is the case, as a candidate is expected to receive about 77% of their previous week’s
support, ceteris paribus. Adding the polling lag also increases the adjusted R-squared from the
previous models (0.68). Like Model 2, the lagged indicators are statistically signiﬁcant, except for
media attention. Substantively, candidates who receive a signiﬁcant inﬂux of endorsements are
expected to increase their polling support by 0.42%; those with a similar rise in public attention are
expected to gain just under one percent in the polls; and those with a spike in fundraising are expected
to gain less than 0.1% in the polls for each $100,000 they bring in to their campaign.

Discussion
Taken collectively, the results from these models suggest that shocks can change a candidate’s
polling position. Those who receive a signiﬁcant increase in money, media attention, and public
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Deviation

Polling
Polling (lag)
Public attention
Public attention (lag)
Endorsements
Endorsements (lag)
Media attention
Media attention (lag)
Donations ($100k)
Donations ($100k) (lag)

7.11
7.13
7.32
6.95
0.46
0.46
3.18
3.03
5.66
5.51

2.2
2.3
2.0
2.0
0
0
1.0
1.0
1.40
1.42

11.14
11.17
12.53
11.35
2.08
2.09
5.54
5.16
1.42
1.35

All monetary ﬁgures are adjusted for inﬂation (2016 dollars).

Minimum
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0.05
0

Maximum
64
64
100
100
33
33
48
48
289.33
289.33

attention are expected to increase their share of polling. Moreover, it is possible that these shocks
do not occur immediately, but over a span of a week or two. Broadly speaking, this implies that
there is hope for candidates who start the pre-primary period with low polling numbers. One
textbook example of a shock during the invisible primary is when California Senator Kamala
Harris confronted former Vice President Joe Biden about busing during a Democratic primary
debate in June, 2019. Prior to that moment, Senator Harris’s public attention was consistently less
than 10% of the ﬁeld’s peak and her polling was around seven percent. In the immediate aftermath
of that exchange, however, her attention spiked at 59% of the ﬁeld’s peak and her polling doubled.
While her success in garnering public attention and polling support waned in subsequent weeks,
this example illustrates the concept of shocks used in this manuscript.

Conclusion
Shocks matter in the invisible primary. A positive shock for a candidate increases their winning
percentage. This is particularly true for the frontrunner, as they can effectively shut the door on
their competitors during this time frame if these types of shock are present. This is consistent with
previous literature from Aldrich (2009), who argues that if a candidate can move ﬁrst in the
Invisible Primary, they can get 15–20% of the vote and seem unbeatable to the opposition.
Negative shocks are a slightly different story. Our ﬁndings suggest that the frontrunner can
survive negative shocks - a disappointing debate, fundraising quarter, gaffe, or perhaps even a
scandal. This is evidenced by Candidate 1 still winning roughly half the time even at 0.18 seed
proportion (in both Figures 2 and 3). Yet, our ﬁndings underscore a nagging truth of presidential
primaries: it is very difﬁcult to overcome the frontrunner. They can afford a slip up or two,
Whether a bad fundraising quarter, or a bad debate performance. Why? In part it is because shocks
tend to be short-term events that die off over time; other stories soon surpass the negative shock in
salience. In addition, the negative shock may simply move voters to being undecided rather than
supporting another candidate. Note that in Figure 2, when a negative shock for Candidate 1 occurs,
the winning percentage increases for Candidate 3 and the undecideds. In Figure 3, Candidate 2 is
aided by a corresponding positive shock (for instance, Candidate 2 had a stellar debate performance at the expense of Candidate 1).
Finally, our broad empirical examination suggests that shocks, operationalized as an increase in
attention on a campaign, can increase a candidate’s standing in the polls. However, it is important
to note that this effect is limited to public attention and not media attention. While further analysis
needs to be conducted, this ﬁnding suggests that candidate success is more public-driven than
elite-driven. An increase in public attention is associated with a larger increase in support than
either media attention or elite endorsements. In an era with large candidate ﬁelds and an emphasis
on small-dollar donations, this ﬁnding could have large implications for the immediate future of
presidential primary campaigns.
This paper extends important research into social networks and presidential primaries, but still
has its limitations. Our goal is to simulate the real possibilities of a presidential primary campaign
and there is still work to be done. Further research should address both the external and internal
dynamics of social networks. For instance, how do underdog candidates emerge as viable threats
to the frontrunner? We see this happen repeatedly during presidential primaries, such as Bernie
Sanders’ upstart campaign in 2016 or Rick Santorum’s in 2012. What about activist endorsements
within a social network? In an era of social media inﬂuencers, how do prominent individuals
signal support and maximize their inﬂuence?
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(1) Media attention is measured as a candidate’s number of TV news mentions. The data comes from the
Vanderbilt TV News Archives.
(2) Fundraising is measured as a candidate’s fundraising receipts from the given week, in 2016 dollars.
Donations and loans from the candidate are not included. The data comes from the FEC.
(3) Endorsements are measured as a candidate’s total endorsement points in a given week. Since not all
endorsements are equal, we weight them differently, where gubernatorial endorsements are worth 10 points,
senatorial endorsements are worth ﬁve points, and House member endorsements are worth one point. Data for
2016 comes from ﬁvethirtyeight.com, while the data for 2008 and 2012 come from Democracy in Action.
(4) Public attention is measured as a candidate’s share of the Google Trends score vis-à-vis their direct
opponents (Ripberger, 2011). The candidate in the race with the highest number of Google searches during
the invisible primary has a score of 100; all other weekly scores are standardized to that share. See
Swearingen et al. (2019) for more details on this measure.
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